---
title: "Tega Industries — Molycop Deep Dive: 5x Revenue, a Q1 Loss"
ticker: "TEGA"
date: "2026-10-25"
tags: ["deep-dive","fundamental","capital-goods","mining-consumables","molycop","special-situation"]
summary: "Tega Industries paid $1.5bn for Molycop: revenue has 5x'd, Q1 FY27 still showed a ₹86 Cr loss, and the stock is 22% off its high. Verdict: CAUTION."
model: "deepseek-v4-flash"
watchlist: true
priceAtAnalysis: 1723.5
support: 1678
resistance: 1790
supports: [1678, 1630, 1473]
resistances: [1790, 1866, 1994]
verdict: "CAUTION"
---

# Tega Industries — Molycop Deep Dive: 5x Revenue, a Q1 Loss

**Ticker:** TEGA (NSE: TEGA, BSE: 543413)
**Sector:** Industrial Products — mining consumables (mill liners, grinding media, screens, mineral processing equipment)
**Price:** ₹1,723.50 (23 Oct 2026, −2.67%)
**Analysis Date:** 25 October 2026
**Data Source:** NSE corporate filings (Q1 FY27 results, 13 Aug 2026; Molycop closing release, 1 Jun 2026; preferential allotment, 15 Oct 2026), Screener.in consolidated view (fetched 25 Oct 2026), TradingView technicals (NSE, at close 23 Oct 2026), NSE bhavcopy (10 sessions to 23 Oct 2026), NSE index bhavcopy, S&P Global Ratings research update (16 Jun 2026), Q1 FY27 earnings call
**Model:** DeepSeek V4 Flash

---

## 1. Quick Snapshot — as of 23 October 2026 close

| Metric | Value |
|--------|-------|
| **Market Cap** | ₹13,031 Cr |
| **Current Price** | ₹1,723.50 |
| **52W High / Low** | ₹2,198 (30 Sep 2026) / ₹1,473 (30 Jul 2026) |
| **Down from 52W high** | −21.6% |
| **Up from 52W low** | +17.0% |
| **Shares outstanding** | 7,56,06,133 |
| **Sales (FY26, consolidated)** | ₹1,692 Cr |
| **Sales (TTM, to June 2026)** | ₹3,059 Cr |
| **Stock P/E** | Not meaningful — trailing twelve months are a loss |
| **Book Value** | ₹451 per share (₹3,407 Cr equity, 30 Jun 2026) |
| **P/B** | 3.8x |
| **ROCE (consolidated)** | 8.14% |
| **ROE (consolidated)** | 5.94% |
| **Net debt (30 Jun 2026)** | ₹6,366 Cr |
| **Enterprise value** | ₹19,397 Cr |
| **EV / run-rate EBITDA** | 8.3x – 9.5x |
| **Dividend yield** | 0.12% |
| **Promoter holding** | 67.51% (quarter ended 30 Sep 2026) |

Two facts have to be held together, because each one on its own is misleading. In June 2026, Tega — a ₹1,700 Cr revenue company from Kolkata that makes the rubber liners inside mining mills — took control of Molycop, a $1.5 billion grinding-media business roughly the size of itself nine times over. One month of that acquisition turned a ₹356 Cr quarter into a ₹1,723 Cr quarter. And that same quarter produced a reported net loss of ₹86 Cr for shareholders, because Tega now pays ₹117 Cr of quarterly interest and ₹74 Cr of quarterly depreciation before it books a rupee of operating profit.

The stock is 21.6% below the high it set four weeks ago. It is also 17% above its 52-week low set in July. Both are true. What follows is an attempt to say which of those two numbers describes the company.

---

## 2. Business Overview — What the Company Actually Does

Tega Industries is a Kolkata-based manufacturer of the wear parts and consumables that sit inside an ore-grinding mill. It has been doing this for fifty years. The business is not a capital-goods manufacturer in the usual sense — it does not sell a machine and move on. It sells a consumable that is replaced on a schedule measured in months, to a customer who cannot afford for it to fail, and it designs each piece bespoke for the individual mill it goes into.

**Three segments, and the mix has just been inverted by the acquisition:**

| Segment | What it sells | Q1 FY27 revenue | Share | Q1 margin before interest, tax and depreciation |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Consumables — Grinding Media | Forged steel grinding balls (Molycop, one month only) | ₹1,291.6 Cr | 74.9% | 13.2% |
| Consumables — Others | Polymer mill liners, screen panels, ceramic wear solutions (legacy Tega) | ₹397.2 Cr | 23.0% | 19.4% |
| Equipment | Mineral processing equipment (Tega McNally) | ₹35.8 Cr | 2.1% | negative |
| **Total** | | **₹1,724.6 Cr** | **100%** | **14.3%** |

Those shares are arithmetic on the filed segment table, and they are distorted: the column contains **one month of Molycop against three months of legacy Tega**. At June's run-rate for the acquired business and a normal quarter for the legacy one, grinding media would be roughly 90% of revenue rather than 75%. The company that this article is about is now, overwhelmingly, a steel-grinding-ball business with a specialty-liner business attached — not the other way round.

**Where the two halves fit.** Tega has spent fifty years selling the wear parts *around* the grinding process: polymer mill liners, screen panels, ceramic wear solutions, and since the McNally Sayaji acquisition, the mineral-processing equipment itself. Molycop makes the *grinding balls that do the grinding*. Same mill, same customer, same ore audit, adjacent purchase order. Tega already had engineers on site designing bespoke liner configurations for individual mills; Molycop sells into 400+ mines across 40 countries from 13 manufacturing facilities, with about 1.8 million tonnes of annual capacity.

The geography is complementary rather than overlapping. Tega's strength — Europe, Middle East, CIS, Latin America, Africa — is where Molycop is thin. Molycop's strength — US, Canada, Australia, Latin America — is where Tega needed scale. The combined footprint is 26 manufacturing sites.

**The customer, and why the consumable is sticky.** Roughly **75–77% of consumables revenue comes from copper and gold miners**. Grinding media is about **6% of a mine's cash cost**, and mines do not economise on it: a liner or a ball charge that underperforms stops a mill, and a stopped mill costs far more per day than the consumable costs per year. That is a genuinely defensible position, and it is also a throughput bet on two commodities — Tega's volume is hostage to other companies' decisions to expand, restart or mothball mines.

**The cost structure is a pass-through, and that governs how the financials should be read.** About **80% of Molycop's cost of goods sold is steel bar**, and roughly **85% of its customer contracts are indexed to steel prices with a one-to-two-quarter lag**. Percentage margins are therefore a poor lens on this business and per-tonne economics are the right one — management said as much on the Q1 call. A sharp steel move distorts two quarters of reported margin in whichever direction it moves, which is why the 13.2% Molycop printed in June should not be annualised naively.

**The moat, stated honestly.** Two things, neither of which is pricing power. First, a design-and-audit relationship: bespoke liner geometry per mill, built from ore and throughput data the customer has already shared. Second, a consumable that is 6% of the cost base and 100% of the bottleneck. That combination produces switching costs and repeat orders. It does not produce the margins of a software business — it produces 13% for grinding media and 19–24% for the specialty consumables, and those are the numbers the rest of this note works with.

---

## 3. Financial Performance

### 3.1 Annual P&L — FY22 to FY26, plus TTM

| ₹ Cr (consolidated) | FY22 | FY23 | FY24 | FY25 | FY26 | TTM |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Sales | 952 | 1,214 | 1,493 | 1,639 | **1,692** | **3,059** |
| Operating profit | 184 | 271 | 317 | 341 | **233** | 231 |
| OPM % | 19% | 22% | 21% | 21% | **14%** | 8% |
| Other income | 27 | 25 | 27 | 48 | 88 | 89 |
| Interest | 17 | 19 | 33 | 28 | 24 | 133 |
| Depreciation | 39 | 41 | 64 | 101 | 95 | 146 |
| Profit before tax | 155 | 236 | 247 | 259 | 201 | 41 |
| Net profit | 117 | 184 | 194 | 200 | **143** | −1 |
| EPS (₹) | 17.63 | 27.73 | 29.14 | 30.08 | 18.99 | 0.64 |

Source: Screener.in consolidated, fetched 25 October 2026. TTM is the twelve months to June 2026.

**The first thing this table does is demolish a comfortable assumption.** The legacy business was not in good shape going into the acquisition. Revenue grew 78% from ₹952 Cr to ₹1,692 Cr over four years, which is respectable; operating profit grew 26% over the same period, from ₹184 Cr to ₹233 Cr, because **FY26 broke the trend: sales rose 3% and operating profit fell 32%, from ₹341 Cr to ₹233 Cr, with the margin going from 21% to 14%.** FY26 was the last clean pre-Molycop year and it was a margin year, not a growth year. Other income more than doubled to ₹88 Cr that year and is the reason net profit only fell to ₹143 Cr rather than tracking the operating line down.

**The second thing it shows is the arithmetic of the deal.** The TTM column carries ₹3,059 Cr of sales — but that is twelve months of legacy revenue plus **one month** of Molycop. It is not a run-rate of anything. The same is true of the cost lines: TTM interest of ₹133 Cr contains a single month at ₹116.7 Cr, against ₹24 Cr for the whole of FY26, and TTM depreciation of ₹146 Cr contains one month at ₹73.6 Cr. Every profitability measure in that column is a blend of two incompatible periods, which is why the reported TTM is a loss of ₹1 Cr while the segment result for Q1 alone was ₹246.5 Cr.

**A note on the TTM column that the data does not resolve.** Screener reports TTM net profit of −₹1 Cr alongside TTM EPS of ₹0.64, and those two cannot both be right on 7.56 crore shares. The −₹1 Cr figure reconciles closely to "profit for the period" (FY26 ₹143 Cr, less Q1 FY26 ₹35.3 Cr, plus Q1 FY27's −₹108.3 Cr, which is −₹0.6 Cr), i.e. it is struck before the ₹22.1 Cr attributed to non-controlling interest. The EPS line does not reconcile to it and is not used anywhere in this note. The figure that matters — and the one the filing states — is the **₹86.2 Cr loss attributable to the owners of Tega**.

**On the "5x revenue" in the title.** From ₹622 Cr in FY15 to a ₹3,059 Cr TTM is 4.9x, so the multiple is a decade-long framing and not a description of the acquisition's step-up. What the deal did, on the numbers above, was take a ₹1,692 Cr revenue base and add a business whose own FY26 revenue was US$1,539 mn. The table cannot show that cleanly because only one month of it has been reported. Q2 FY27 will.

### 3.2 The Molycop transaction — what actually happened in June

The Molycop transaction closed on **1 June 2026**. Tega, in consortium with funds managed by Apollo, bought Molycop — the world's largest forged grinding-media producer — from American Industrial Partners at an enterprise value of approximately **US$1.5 billion**.

The industrial logic is genuinely tight, and it is set out in Section 2. What matters here is the financing and the accounting, because those two determine what a shareholder actually owns.

**The funding, which matters more than the headline number.** S&P Global Ratings laid out the capital structure when it assigned a **'B−' issuer credit rating to Tega MC SG Investments III Pte. Ltd.** (the JV that owns Molycop) on 16 June 2026, with a **positive outlook**:

- **~US$740 mn of equity** — US$470 mn of common equity from Tega and Apollo combined, plus US$270 mn of preferred equity from Apollo
- **US$220 mn five-year asset-based lending facility**, US$138 mn drawn at close
- **US$700 mn seven-year senior secured Term Loan B**
- Molycop's existing US$950 mn term loan, held by AIP MC Holdings, repaid in full at closing
- **US$120 mn earnout** tied to the restart of the Cobre Panama and Grasberg mines, payable on resumed grinding-media shipments

Tega's own purchase consideration for its controlling stake was **₹4,190.7 Cr (US$442.7 mn)**, per Note 5 to the Q1 FY27 consolidated results. That is Tega's share of the purchase price — the rest of the equity came from Apollo.

**The accounting that produced the loss.** The acquisition was accounted for under Ind AS 103 on a **provisional** basis:

- Identifiable intangible assets recognised: **₹3,429.5 Cr (US$362.3 mn)**
- Goodwill recognised: **₹4,995.7 Cr (US$527.7 mn)**

That is **₹8,425 Cr of the ₹22,571 Cr consolidated balance sheet sitting in goodwill and intangibles — 37% of total assets** — and the purchase-price allocation is explicitly provisional, with up to a year from the acquisition date to finalise it. This is the single largest accounting fact about the company today and it is the one almost nobody is discussing.

### 3.3 Q1 FY27 — reading the reported loss properly

The quarter ended 30 June 2026 includes **one month of Molycop** and three months of the legacy business. Consolidated figures, ₹ crore:

| Line item | Q1 FY27 | Q1 FY26 | YoY |
|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue from operations | 1,723.4 | 356.1 | +384% |
| Other income | 17.4 | 15.5 | +12% |
| **Segment result before interest, tax and depreciation** | **246.5** | **55.6** | **+343%** |
| Less: one-time acquisition and integration expenses | 191.0 | — | — |
| Less: finance costs | 116.7 | 6.2 | +1,789% |
| Less: depreciation and amortisation | 73.6 | 23.1 | +219% |
| Add: share of joint-venture profit | 0.9 | 1.3 | −35% |
| **Profit / (loss) before tax** | **(116.5)** | **43.2** | — |
| Tax (credit) | (8.2) | 7.9 | — |
| Profit / (loss) for the period | (108.3) | 35.3 | — |
| **Attributable to owners of Tega** | **(86.2)** | **35.3** | — |
| Attributable to non-controlling interest | (22.1) | — | — |
| **EPS (basic)** | **−₹11.47** | **₹5.31** | — |

*Source: Unaudited consolidated results for the quarter ended 30 June 2026, filed with NSE on 13 August 2026.*

Three things in that table deserve more attention than the headline loss.

**The operating business did not lose money.** Segment result before interest, tax and depreciation was ₹246.5 Cr. Add other income and you get the ₹264 Cr "adjusted EBITDA" management quoted on the call — 15.2% of total income, in line with the ~15% group margin the company guided to for FY27. The ₹86.2 Cr loss is entirely the cost of owning the asset: ₹191.0 Cr of one-time transaction expenses (which do not recur), ₹116.7 Cr of finance costs and ₹73.6 Cr of depreciation.

**Segment by segment, the shape is clear:**

| Segment | Q1 FY27 revenue | Q1 FY27 pre-interest/tax/dep result | Margin |
|---|---|---|---|
| Consumables — Grinding Media (Molycop, 1 month) | ₹1,291.6 Cr | ₹171.1 Cr | 13.2% |
| Consumables — Others (legacy Tega) | ₹397.2 Cr | ₹77.2 Cr | 19.4% |
| Equipment (Tega McNally) | ₹35.8 Cr | −₹1.6 Cr | negative |
| **Total** | **₹1,724.6 Cr** | **₹246.5 Cr** | **14.3%** |

Molycop contributed ₹1,291.6 Cr of revenue and ₹171.1 Cr of operating result in a **single month**, at a 13.2% margin — ahead of the ~12% margin Molycop earned across its own FY26 and marginally ahead of what management had underwritten at the time of the deal. On the call, Molycop's CFO described the June month as "directionally ahead of our expectation at the time of the acquisition."

The legacy business was the better story. Excluding Molycop, revenue rose 21% to ₹433.0 Cr against ₹356.1 Cr in the year-earlier quarter. Management put legacy EBITDA growth at 42% with margin expanding from 19.1% to 22.1%; the filed segment result for the two legacy segments is ₹75.6 Cr for the quarter, which is the figure used in the run-rate arithmetic in Section 4. The consumables piece (excluding grinding media) grew revenue 36% to ₹397.2 Cr and expanded margin 320 basis points to 24.1%, both as stated by management on the call.

**The equipment business is the weak spot, and it is being discounted.** Tega McNally revenue fell 44% to ₹35.8 Cr from ₹64.3 Cr, and the segment swung to a small operating loss. Management attributed it to delayed customer clearances on project orders. Equipment is a lumpy, order-timing business — but a 44% fall with a negative segment result is not a rounding error, and it is the second consecutive year in which the equipment growth case has slipped.

**One number that needs correcting wherever you read it.** Several syndicated summaries report Tega's order book as "$12,060 million, up 18%, with $9,060 million executable within 12 months." That is a currency error in the coverage. The figures are in **rupees, not dollars**: the legacy order book is **₹1,206 Cr (₹12,060 mn), up 18% year-on-year, with about ₹906 Cr (₹9,060 mn) executable within twelve months**. A $12 billion order book against $1.5 billion of annual revenue would be a different company altogether. The dollar figure should not be repeated.

### 3.4 Ratios — what five years of returns and working capital actually did

| Ratio | FY22 | FY23 | FY24 | FY25 | FY26 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| ROCE % | 19% | 21% | 19% | 18% | **8%** |
| Debtor days | 106 | 121 | 109 | 112 | 97 |
| Inventory days | 229 | 200 | 209 | 217 | 233 |
| Days payable | 88 | 77 | 104 | 116 | **178** |
| Cash conversion cycle (days) | 247 | 244 | 215 | 212 | **153** |
| Working capital days | 92 | 109 | 86 | 100 | 77 |

Source: Screener.in consolidated ratios. Cash conversion cycle is debtor days plus inventory days less days payable, as Screener reports it.

**Two readings, and they point in opposite directions.** The obvious one is that working capital improved sharply — the cash conversion cycle fell 59 days in FY26 to 153, the best in five years, and working capital days fell to 77. The less obvious one is **where that improvement came from**: debtors improved only 15 days, inventory actually worsened 16 days, and the entire release came from stretching creditors from 116 days to 178. Tega took 62 more days of supplier credit in FY26 than it took in FY25. That is a real source of cash and it is not repeatable in the same size again; it also means the FY26 operating cash flow described in Section 5 was partly a balance-sheet release rather than an earnings achievement.

**The ROCE line is the most important number in this table.** Tega earned 18–21% on capital through FY22–FY25 and **8% in FY26**, the last clean pre-acquisition year. The fall is not a working-capital effect: it follows the ₹341 Cr to ₹233 Cr operating-profit decline, against a capital employed that kept growing — total assets rose from ₹1,885 Cr in FY24 to ₹4,310 Cr in FY26, a 2.3x increase in two years. Whatever the Molycop acquisition has done for growth, it was bolted onto a business whose returns had already halved. That is the number the bull case has to answer, and Section 15 does not find an easy answer to it.

---

## 4. Balance Sheet — Five Years

| ₹ Cr (consolidated) | Mar'22 | Mar'23 | Mar'24 | Mar'25 | Mar'26 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Equity capital | 66 | 66 | 67 | 67 | 75 |
| Reserves | 670 | 983 | 1,125 | 1,330 | **3,332** |
| Borrowings | 245 | 361 | 308 | 330 | **398** |
| Other liabilities | 189 | 219 | 385 | 363 | 504 |
| **Total liabilities / assets** | 1,170 | 1,629 | 1,885 | 2,089 | **4,310** |
| Fixed assets | 298 | 548 | 600 | 623 | 661 |
| CWIP | 10 | 12 | 11 | 48 | 111 |
| Investments | 199 | 217 | 279 | 262 | 227 |
| Other assets | 663 | 852 | 995 | 1,157 | **3,311** |

Source: Screener.in consolidated balance sheet. These are **31 March 2026** figures — the last balance sheet before the Molycop acquisition closed on 1 June 2026. The post-acquisition balance sheet is ₹22,571 Cr (Section 3.2).

**Read this as the pre-deal balance sheet, and it is a conservative one.** Total assets grew 3.7x in four years, from ₹1,170 Cr to ₹4,310 Cr, and the growth was almost entirely equity: reserves went from ₹670 Cr to ₹3,332 Cr while borrowings went from ₹245 Cr to ₹398 Cr. At 31 March 2026 Tega carried debt of ₹398 Cr against equity of ₹3,407 Cr — a debt/equity ratio of 0.12, on the eve of borrowing more than ₹11,000 Cr.

**The line that deserves the attention is "other assets" at ₹3,311 Cr, which is 77% of the total.** That is the receivables, inventory, cash and loans book — the working capital of a ₹1,692 Cr revenue manufacturer, plus the treasury from the ₹1,714 Cr equity raise completed in November 2025. Fixed assets are ₹661 Cr and CWIP ₹111 Cr, so this was never a capital-intensive business and the Chile plant described in Section 15.3 is the one real capex programme in the record. Everything else was funded by retained earnings and one large equity issue. **The Molycop acquisition converted that profile in a single quarter**: from ₹398 Cr of borrowings to approximately ₹11,200 Cr of group debt, and from ₹4,310 Cr of assets to ₹22,571 Cr.

This is where the market's scepticism and the company's arithmetic diverge, and it is worth being precise because the difference is large.

**What management disclosed on the Q1 call:**

- **Net debt fell ₹3,218 Cr (US$340 mn) during the quarter**, ending at **₹6,366 Cr (US$672.5 mn)** on 30 June 2026, against ₹9,580 Cr (US$1.0 bn) on 31 March 2026.
- **Total group debt was approximately ₹11,200 Cr, including ₹2,600 Cr of redeemable preference shares.** (₹11,200 Cr less ₹6,366 Cr of net debt implies roughly ₹4,800 Cr of cash on the consolidated balance sheet — that is arithmetic from the two disclosed figures, not a separately disclosed number.)
- The company's stated target is **3x debt/EBITDA within three to four years**, to be achieved through operating cash flow, refinancing and the sale of non-core land parcels.

**What S&P sees.** S&P projects Molycop's standalone adjusted leverage at **7x–7.5x for fiscal 2026** — around 7.2x on US$170–175 mn of EBITDA — because its adjusted debt includes the US$270 mn of preferred equity with assumed payment-in-kind dividends, the US$120 mn contingent earnout, and US$50 mn of other adjustments. Its downside scenario for the positive outlook is leverage "above 7x in fiscal 2027."

**Both are true and they measure different things.** S&P is rating the Molycop JV on a standalone basis with a punitive definition of debt. Tega's ₹6,366 Cr net debt is the consolidated group including a large cash balance and excluding the preferred from net debt. Neither is wrong.

**The pro-forma arithmetic, which is mine and labelled as such.** On a run-rate basis:

- Legacy business: ₹309 Cr of pre-interest/tax/depreciation result in FY26; ₹75.6 Cr in Q1 FY27, annualising to roughly **₹300 Cr**
- Molycop: ₹171.1 Cr in June alone, or roughly **₹1,750–2,050 Cr** a year, depending on whether you use its own FY26 margin (~12%) or the June run-rate (13.2%)
- Group run-rate: **₹2,050–2,350 Cr**

Against ₹6,366 Cr of net debt, that is **2.7x–3.1x net debt/EBITDA right now** — essentially at the 3x target the company set for three to four years out, because ₹1,714 Cr of equity was raised in November 2025 at ₹1,994 a share and a further ₹3,218 Cr was de-levered in the first quarter.

That arithmetic has two material caveats and I want them stated plainly. **First**, Q1 contained one month of Molycop and three months of legacy; the June month may not be representative. **Second**, the ₹2,600 Cr of redeemable preference shares sits in debt if you are S&P and outside net debt if you are the company; adding it would move the ratio to roughly 3.8x–4.4x. A reader should treat "the leverage problem is smaller than the headline suggests" as the conclusion and 2.7x–3.1x as arithmetic, not as guidance.

---

## 5. Cash Flow — Is the Profit Real?

| ₹ Cr (consolidated) | FY22 | FY23 | FY24 | FY25 | FY26 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cash from operations (CFO) | 14 | 179 | 252 | 195 | **350** |
| Cash from investing | −25 | −235 | −96 | −129 | **−991** |
| Cash from financing | 3 | 63 | −115 | −38 | **1,690** |
| Net cash flow | −8 | 6 | 41 | 28 | 1,050 |
| **Free cash flow (as reported)** | **−27** | **179** | **252** | **195** | **350** |
| **CFO / EBITDA** | 31% | 83% | 93% | 75% | **195%** |

Source: Screener.in consolidated cash-flow statement. The series runs FY17–FY26; FY22–FY26 is shown here to match the P&L table in Section 3.1.

**FY26 is a genuinely strong operating-cash year, and FY22 is the cautionary one.** Operating cash flow went from ₹14 Cr in FY22 to ₹350 Cr in FY26 — which is 245% of that year's ₹143 Cr net profit and, on Screener's measure, 195% of EBITDA. Profit was real and then some. FY22 is the counter-example worth remembering: ₹117 Cr of reported profit converted into ₹14 Cr of operating cash, a 31% conversion, because working capital absorbed the difference. For a company of this type, one year of weak conversion is normal and five would be a problem; Tega has had four good years out of five.

**The financing line is the November 2025 raise, and it is identifiable.** FY26 financing inflow of ₹1,690 Cr is within ₹24 Cr of the ₹1,714 Cr preferential issue struck at ₹1,994 a share in November 2025, net of the dividend and other flows. That is the equity that funded the Molycop consideration, and it shows up here rather than in the operating business — which is the right place for it to show up.

**Two things about the free-cash-flow line that should be flagged rather than accepted.** First, Screener reports FY26 free cash flow as identical to CFO at ₹350 Cr, which cannot be literally right: fixed assets rose ₹38 Cr and CWIP rose ₹63 Cr during the year against ₹95 Cr of depreciation, so capital expenditure was not zero. Treat ₹350 Cr as operating cash flow and deduct the capital spend before calling it free. Second, the investing outflow of ₹991 Cr in FY26 is far larger than any capex programme in the record — it is the year in which the acquisition and related investments appear, and it is the reason the financing line had to be ₹1,690 Cr.

**What this section actually establishes.** The legacy business generates cash ahead of its reported profit, which is the single best argument against the "accounting story" reading of Tega. The cash-flow statement has not yet been through a year containing Molycop. The FY27 statement — the first with twelve months of the acquired business, its ₹467 Cr annualised interest bill and its working capital — is where this test becomes interesting, and it is not available yet.

---

## 6. Shareholding Pattern

| % | Mar'22 | Mar'23 | Mar'24 | Mar'25 | Mar'26 | Sep'26 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Promoters | 79.17 | 79.10 | 74.78 | 74.80 | 67.51 | **67.51** |
| FIIs | 2.17 | 2.41 | 1.48 | 1.73 | 2.14 | **2.86** |
| DIIs | 8.95 | 12.05 | 19.10 | 18.76 | 18.97 | **17.15** |
| Public | 9.71 | 6.43 | 4.63 | 4.70 | 11.38 | **12.49** |
| No. of shareholders | 1,12,682 | 70,716 | 56,862 | 52,986 | 53,867 | **57,152** |

Source: Screener.in consolidated shareholding, annual columns to March plus the September 2026 quarter.

**Four observations, in order of how much they matter.**

- **The promoter stake fell 11.66 percentage points in four years and 7.37 points in the last three,** from 79.17% to 67.51%. The mechanism was dilution, not sale: the November 2025 preferential issue at ₹1,994 and the earlier rounds. That is the benign version of a falling promoter stake, and Screener's con is nonetheless factually right. There has been no promoter buying at any point in the decline.
- **The register emptied and then refilled.** Shareholders fell from 1,12,682 to 52,986 between March 2022 and March 2025 — a 53% decline in three years — while DIIs went from 8.95% to 18.76%. Institutions replaced retail through the 2021–2024 period, which is what a re-rating looks like on a share register.
- **That reversed in FY26, and reversed hard.** Public holding jumped from 4.70% to 11.38% in a single year and the shareholder count rose for the first time, to 53,867. Public holding rose again to 12.49% in the September quarter. After a ₹1,714 Cr issue at ₹1,994 into a stock now at ₹1,723.50, a wider and more recently-diluted register is the expected outcome.
- **The September quarter is the interesting one, because the institutions split.** FIIs added 72 basis points to 2.86% while DIIs cut 182 basis points to 17.15% — a net institutional reduction of about 1.1 points in the quarter the stock made its high and began falling. Foreign money bought; domestic money sold. Neither number is large enough to be decisive, and the direction of the DII line is worth watching into the December quarter.

**One timing point that matters for reading the table.** The 15 October 2026 allotment of 4,78,435 shares to AP Jupiter Holdings II, Ltd. took paid-up capital from 7,51,27,698 to 7,56,06,133 shares. That is 0.63% of the enlarged equity and it happened **after** the 30 September cutoff, so it is not in the September column and will first appear in the December 2026 filing.

---

## 7. Order Book and Revenue Visibility

This section exists mainly to correct a number, and the correction is the whole of it. Several syndicated summaries report Tega's order book as "$12,060 million, up 18%, with $9,060 million executable within 12 months." The figures are in **rupees**: the legacy order book is **₹1,206 Cr (₹12,060 mn), up 18% year-on-year, with about ₹906 Cr (₹9,060 mn) executable within twelve months.**

| Measure | Value | What it means |
|---|---|---|
| Legacy order book (Q1 FY27) | ₹1,206 Cr | +18% year on year; legacy business only |
| Executable within 12 months | ₹906 Cr | 75% of the book converts inside a year |
| Cover against FY26 legacy revenue | 0.71x | Less than one year of revenue |
| Molycop order book | Not disclosed in this data set | Not estimated here |
| Molycop capacity and reach | 1.8 mn tonnes; 13 plants; 400+ mines in 40 countries | The volume base, not a backlog |

**The cover ratio is the point.** ₹1,206 Cr of order book against ₹1,692 Cr of FY26 revenue is 0.71x — roughly nine months of work. WABAG, in the companion note, trades on a 4.9x cover. Tega does not have a backlog business and should not be valued as one: mill liners, screen panels and grinding balls are reordered on consumption cycles measured in months, so visibility comes from the customer relationship and the replacement schedule, not from a contracted book. Anyone quoting a multi-year revenue visibility figure for this company is describing a different company.

**What actually provides the visibility.** Three things, none of them an order book. First, grinding media is a consumable with a known consumption rate per tonne of ore milled, so Molycop's revenue tracks mine throughput more closely than it tracks order intake — and 75–77% of it tracks copper and gold throughput. Second, 85% of Molycop's contracts are steel-indexed with a one-to-two-quarter lag, which stabilises revenue while it distorts margin. Third, the legacy business carries the ₹1,206 Cr book with three-quarters of it executable within the year, which is short but is genuinely firm.

**The honest caveat.** No Molycop order book, backlog or contracted-volume figure appears in the data behind this note. The ₹1,206 Cr is the legacy business, the 18% growth is legacy growth, and the 75% twelve-month convertibility is legacy. The 74.9% of Q1 revenue that came from grinding media has no disclosed backlog at all, and this note does not put a number on it.

---

## 8. Management Commentary — What Was Actually Said

From the Q1 FY27 earnings call of 13 August 2026, the results filing of the same date, the Molycop closing release of 1 June 2026 and the S&P Global Ratings research update of 16 June 2026. The three quoted passages below are verbatim from the call; everything not in quotation marks is a paraphrase of a stated figure, not a quotation.

### 8.1 On the quarter

- **Group adjusted EBITDA of ₹264 Cr, 15.2% of total income**, described as in line with the ~15% group margin guided to for FY27. This is a checkable claim (Section 8.5).
- **Legacy EBITDA growth of 42%, with margin expanding from 19.1% to 22.1%.** The filed segment result for the two legacy segments is ₹75.6 Cr, which is the figure to reconcile against.
- **Consumables excluding grinding media: revenue +36% to ₹397.2 Cr, margin +320 bps to 24.1%.**
- **Equipment revenue −44% to ₹35.8 Cr**, attributed to delayed customer clearances on project orders.
- On Molycop's first month, the **Molycop CFO** described June as:

> "directionally ahead of our expectation at the time of the acquisition."

### 8.2 On deleveraging and the debt target

- **Net debt fell ₹3,218 Cr to ₹6,366 Cr** during the quarter, against ₹9,580 Cr at 31 March 2026.
- **Total group debt approximately ₹11,200 Cr, including ₹2,600 Cr of redeemable preference shares.**
- **Stated target: 3x debt/EBITDA within three to four years**, to be achieved through operating cash flow, refinancing and the sale of non-core land parcels.

### 8.3 On guidance — the cut, and the reason for it

Molycop's FY27 growth guidance was **cut to 3% from an informal 7–8%**. The reason given was specific: the guidance had assumed the Cobre Panama and Grasberg mines would restart in FY27, adding a step-change in grinding-media volume, and:

> "based on current market indicators, this restart has been deferred to FY28."

That guidance was cut on 13 August 2026. Seven weeks later, on **30 September 2026**, a Panamanian inter-ministerial commission recommended to President José Raúl Mulino that Cobre Panama be restarted. The assumption behind the cut is therefore moving back in the company's favour, which is covered in Section 15.3 — and it means the 3% guidance is now the conservative number rather than the central one.

### 8.4 On synergies and the Chile plant

- **Cross-selling is a Q3–Q4 FY27 event, not a Q1–Q2 one.** Both the CEO and the CFO were explicit about this and asked for:

> "a couple of quarters of patience."

- **Target: approximately US$20 mn of synergies over two to two and a half years** — procurement, SG&A, operating efficiency. Against US$2 bn of revenue that is about 1%, and management did not oversell it.
- **Chile plant: 50–60% complete on civil work**, soft commissioning targeted for January 2027, commercial production March 2027, subject to regulatory approval, at a capital cost of around US$25–30 mn. Management flagged that bookings may slip into the following year if approvals lag.

### 8.5 What the commentary is worth

**The claims that check out.** The ₹264 Cr adjusted EBITDA is not a management invention: ₹246.5 Cr of filed segment result plus ₹17.4 Cr of other income is ₹263.9 Cr, and ₹263.9 Cr against total income of ₹1,740.8 Cr is 15.2%. Two independently reported lines reconcile to the quoted number to within ₹0.1 Cr. The same is true of the legacy segment result: ₹77.2 Cr for consumables-others plus −₹1.6 Cr for equipment is ₹75.6 Cr, which is what the filing says. On the numbers that can be tested, management's arithmetic is straight.

**The claim that is slightly generous.** Molycop's own FY26 performance is described as US$1,539 mn of revenue at a ~12% EBITDA margin. S&P, rating the same business, puts Molycop's adjusted EBITDA at US$170–175 mn. On US$1,539 mn of revenue that is an **11.0–11.4% margin**, marginally below the ~12% management quotes. The gap is small and could easily be an adjusted-versus-reported difference, but the practical consequence is that the June month's 13.2% should be read against a ~11% base rather than a ~12% one until Molycop's standalone accounts are filed. That makes June look better, not worse — and it makes the FY26 base for the run-rate arithmetic in Section 4 slightly high.

**The claim that has already slipped three times.** The Chile commissioning date. This is the one date management has now given on three consecutive calls, and it has moved on all three. Treat March 2027 as a target with a track record attached.

**The claim that is unfalsifiable today.** US$20 mn of synergies over two to two and a half years. There is no line item for it, no baseline, and no way to distinguish a procurement saving from a steel-price effect in a business where 80% of cost is steel. It is 1% of revenue and should be weighted as such.

**One thing management did not say, and it is the omission that matters most.** In a quarter with a ₹191.0 Cr one-time charge, ₹116.7 Cr of finance costs and a ₹86.2 Cr attributable loss, no forward EPS guidance was given — not for FY27 and not for the first full quarter of ownership. The company guided margin (15%), volume (3%), deleveraging (3x in three to four years) and synergies (US$20 mn). It did not guide earnings. Section 11 explains why that is the single largest gap in the investment case and why this note does not fill it.

---

## 9. Technical Analysis — as of the 23 October 2026 Close

Technicals are TradingView's NSE panel **at close on 23 October 2026**, cross-checked against indicators computed independently from the daily series — RSI 37.2 both ways, and the moving-average ladder matches to within ₹1 a line.

**Summary: Sell.** Sell 15, Neutral 9, Buy 2. Moving averages read **Strong sell** (14 sell, 1 neutral, 0 buy). Oscillators read **Neutral** (1 sell, 8 neutral, 2 buy).

### 9.1 Oscillators (as of 23 October 2026)

| Indicator | Value | Signal |
|---|---|---|
| RSI (14) | 37.2 | Neutral |
| Stochastic %K (14,3,3) | 6.0 | Neutral |
| CCI (20) | −177.0 | Neutral |
| ADX (14) | 23.3 | Neutral |
| Awesome Oscillator | −67.2 | Neutral |
| Momentum (10) | −234.6 | Buy |
| MACD (12,26) | −16.8 | Sell |
| Stochastic RSI Fast | −0.0 | Neutral |
| Williams %R (14) | −90.8 | Buy |
| Bull Bear Power | −304.8 | Neutral |
| Ultimate Oscillator | 32.8 | Neutral |

Two readings matter. **Williams %R at −90.8 and Stochastic %K at 6.0 are deeply oversold**, which is where bounces start — but RSI at 37.2 is not yet at the 30 level that has historically marked Tega's tradeable lows, and MACD at −16.8 is a clear sell signal that has not begun to curl up. Oversold is a condition, not a trigger.

### 9.2 Moving averages (as of 23 October 2026)

| Type | Period | Value | Position vs ₹1,723.50 |
|---|---|---|---|
| EMA | 10 | ₹1,861.0 | Price 8.0% below |
| SMA | 10 | ₹1,876.2 | Price 8.9% below |
| EMA | 20 | ₹1,896.7 | Price 10.0% below |
| SMA | 20 | ₹1,971.3 | Price 14.4% below |
| EMA | 30 | ₹1,885.5 | Price 9.4% below |
| SMA | 30 | ₹1,936.1 | Price 12.3% below |
| EMA | 50 | ₹1,844.9 | Price 7.0% below |
| SMA | 50 | ₹1,823.1 | Price 5.8% below |
| EMA | 100 | ₹1,787.5 | Price 3.7% below |
| SMA | 100 | ₹1,748.5 | Price 1.5% below |
| **EMA** | **200** | **₹1,760.0** | **Price 2.1% below** |
| **SMA** | **200** | **₹1,734.6** | **Price 0.6% below** |
| Ichimoku Base Line | 9,26,52,26 | ₹1,914.2 | Price 11.1% below |
| VWMA | 20 | ₹2,006.3 | Price 16.4% below |
| Hull MA | 9 | ₹1,737.3 | Price 0.8% below |

**Price is below all fifteen.** That is the fact the summary gauge is describing. But the useful detail is *where*: the 200-day averages — EMA at ₹1,760 and SMA at ₹1,734.6 — sit in a **₹1,734–1,762 band just above the current price**, and the Hull MA at ₹1,737 is in the same band. Price closed 0.6% below the 200-day SMA and 2.1% below the 200-day EMA. The stock is not in freefall; it is sitting on the long-term trend line, in the band that decides whether this is a pullback or a trend change.

Above price, the VWMA at ₹2,006 is 16.4% away and tells you the volume-weighted cost of the last twenty sessions is far above the current price — the recent buyers are all underwater.

### 9.3 Pivot levels (Classic, daily)

| Level | Classic |
|---|---|
| R3 | ₹3,273.2 |
| R2 | ₹2,609.8 |
| R1 | ₹2,358.3 |
| P | ₹1,946.4 |
| **S1** | **₹1,694.9** |
| S2 | ₹1,283.0 |
| S3 | ₹619.6 |

The pivot set is distorted by a very wide recent range — an S3 at ₹619 is not a usable level, it is an artefact of a single large-range session. What is usable is **Classic S1 at ₹1,694.9**, which sits within ₹17 of the 23 October intraday low of ₹1,678.4. Two independent methods pointing at ₹1,680–1,695 is the most concrete support zone on the chart.

### 9.4 Delivery data — the last ten sessions, 9 to 23 October 2026

| Date | Close | Volume | Deliverable qty | Delivery % |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 09 Oct 2026 | ₹1,935.00 | 3,28,913 | 1,13,371 | 34.47% |
| 12 Oct 2026 | ₹1,901.90 | 2,98,852 | 1,06,240 | 35.55% |
| 13 Oct 2026 | ₹1,993.60 | 3,21,375 | 1,29,998 | 40.45% |
| 14 Oct 2026 | ₹1,968.50 | 1,84,279 | 73,982 | 40.15% |
| 15 Oct 2026 | ₹1,888.70 | 2,15,221 | 99,489 | 46.23% |
| 16 Oct 2026 | ₹1,923.10 | 1,86,558 | 67,475 | 36.17% |
| 19 Oct 2026 | ₹1,865.40 | 1,26,165 | 57,055 | 45.22% |
| 21 Oct 2026 | ₹1,792.00 | 3,08,593 | 1,75,232 | 56.78% |
| 22 Oct 2026 | ₹1,770.70 | 2,02,616 | 76,340 | 37.68% |
| 23 Oct 2026 | ₹1,723.50 | 2,58,523 | 1,05,962 | 40.99% |

*Ten-session average delivery: 41.37% (range 34.47%–56.78%). Ten-session average volume: 2,43,109 shares. There was no trading session on 20 October.*

Read against its **own** ten-session average of 41.37%, the final session's 40.99% is a delta of **−0.38 percentage points** — flat. Volume at 2,58,523 was **1.07x** the prior nine-session average. So the last day of the decline was ordinary: no volume capitulation, no delivery spike, no distribution signature. The stock fell 2.67% and nobody panicked.

The one reading worth flagging is **21 October: 56.78% delivery on 3,08,593 shares, the highest of the ten sessions, on a −4.1% day.** Elevated delivery on a down day is either a large holder exiting through the delivery mechanism or a value buyer taking stock down. The bhavcopy cannot tell you which; the trade tape can, and I have not seen it. It is the only genuinely unusual print in the series.

### 9.5 Relative performance

| Period | Tega | Nifty Smallcap 250 | Nifty Capital Goods | Nifty Metal |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 month (23 Sep → 23 Oct 2026) | **−17.1%** | −11.0% | −11.6% | −13.7% |
| 3 months (23 Jul → 23 Oct 2026) | **+10.8%** | −7.2% | −9.8% | −8.0% |
| From the 30 Jul 2026 low | **+17.0%** | −8.2% | — | — |

This table is the cleanest summary of what has happened. Over three months Tega has beaten its index by roughly **18 percentage points** and its sector by **20 points** — the Molycop re-rating was real. Over the last month it has given back faster than either. That is the signature of a high-beta, event-driven name unwinding a crowded move, not of a company-specific collapse.

For context on the last month: the entire cyclical complex sold off. Nifty Metal −13.7%, Nifty Capital Goods −11.6%, Nifty India Manufacturing −9.4%, Nifty Midcap 150 −10.2%. Against that, Tega's −17.1% is an underperformance of about 5.5 points versus its own sector — meaningful, but a fraction of the 21.6% headline.

**What the technical picture says in one sentence:** a 49% rally from the July low to the 30 September high has unwound 21.6%, and the stock is now resting on its 200-day moving average, below every shorter average, with oversold oscillators and no evidence of either accumulation or capitulation in the delivery data.

---

## 10. Block Deals & Insider Activity

**Bulk and block deals: there is no NSE bulk or block deal record for Tega in the data behind this note, and none is inferred.** The bhavcopy in Section 9.4 shows one anomalous delivery print — 1,75,232 shares delivered on 21 October at ₹1,792, which is roughly ₹31 Cr of stock taken to the depository on a −4.1% day — and that is consistent with a single large holder exiting, but the delivery file cannot attribute it and this note does not. Where the trade tape would settle it, the tape is unavailable.

**What is on the record is capital action rather than open-market dealing**, and there are two placements worth setting out:

| Date | Action | Size | Price | Counterparty |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 15 Oct 2026 | Preferential allotment, 4,78,435 shares | ₹95.40 Cr | ₹1,994 | AP Jupiter Holdings II, Ltd. (Apollo entity, non-promoter, 0.63%) |
| Nov 2025 | Preferential issue | ₹1,714 Cr | ₹1,994 | Institutional placement, funded the Molycop equity |

Source: NSE intimation of allotment, 15 October 2026; the November 2025 issue price is disclosed in the same filing as the reference price for the October round.

**The size is trivial and the signals are not.** ₹95.40 Cr against a ₹13,031 Cr market capitalisation is 0.7% of the company, and 4,78,435 shares change nothing about control. What the filing says that matters is:
- **The price is identical to the November 2025 round** — ₹1,994, including a premium of ₹1,984 on a ₹10 face value. Apollo's consortium partner took stock at exactly the price struck a year earlier, while the market price is ₹1,723.50. Both rounds were struck 15.7% above the current price, and the stock is 13.6% below them.
- **It puts Apollo on Tega's register, not only inside the JV.** AP Jupiter Holdings II is a non-promoter entity and now holds 0.63% directly.

**Promoter activity: none.** Promoter holding is 67.51% in both March 2026 and September 2026 — unchanged across two quarters, and unchanged through a 21.6% drawdown from the 30 September high. There has been no promoter purchase and no disclosed pledge. The 7.37 percentage-point decline over three years is dilution from the preferential issues, not disposal, and Section 6 sets out the mechanism.

**Insider and institutional flow in the September quarter.** FIIs added 72 bps to 2.86% and DIIs cut 182 bps to 17.15% (Section 6). That is the only quarter in the record where the two institutional categories moved in opposite directions, and it is the quarter in which the stock peaked.

**Read against the price action.** With no block deal, no promoter sale and no negative filing in October, the 21.6% drawdown was done in the open market by ordinary holders at ordinary delivery rates. That is a de-rating, not a corporate event — and Section 9.4's flat 40.99% delivery on the final down day is the corroboration.

---

## 11. Forward PE Valuation

### 11.1 There is no forward PE, and saying so is the honest answer

A forward PE requires a forward EPS. **No FY27 or FY28 EPS estimate exists in the data behind this note** — not from the company, which guided margin, volume, deleveraging and synergies but not earnings (Section 8.5), and not from any broker model in the material available. The trailing multiple is also unavailable, because the trailing twelve months are a loss. **No forward PE is presented here, and none is estimated.**

What can be said precisely is what the current price requires. At ₹13,031 Cr of market capitalisation, the multiple is a straight function of whatever attributable profit eventually arrives:

| Annual profit attributable to Tega shareholders | Implied P/E at ₹13,031 Cr |
|---|---|
| ₹400 Cr | 32.6x |
| ₹500 Cr | 26.1x |
| ₹650 Cr | 20.0x |
| ₹800 Cr | 16.3x |
| ₹1,000 Cr | 13.0x |

Those are divisions, not forecasts. The table exists to make one point: **a 20x multiple on this market capitalisation requires ₹650 Cr of profit a year, and the company has never earned more than ₹200 Cr.** FY25's ₹200 Cr was the peak, on ₹1,639 Cr of revenue. The step-up required is 3.25x the best year in the company's history, and it has to be delivered while servicing ₹467 Cr of annualised interest at Q1's run-rate and while roughly a fifth of Molycop's economics accrues to non-controlling interest (Section 13).

### 11.2 The multiples that do exist

| Measure | Value | Basis |
|---|---|---|
| EV / run-rate EBITDA | **8.3x – 9.5x** | ₹19,397 Cr EV against ₹2,050–2,350 Cr run-rate EBITDA (Section 4, arithmetic) |
| P/B | 3.8x | ₹1,723.50 against ₹451 book value per share |
| Trailing P/E | Not meaningful | TTM is a loss |
| Forward P/E | **Not available** | No earnings estimate exists (Section 11.1) |
| Peer median P/E (listed capital goods) | 32.7x | As cited in Section 17 |

**EV/EBITDA is the only multiple here that means anything today, and it is the one the bull case rests on.** At 8.3x–9.5x run-rate, Tega is priced at a quarter to a third of the 32.7x median P/E carried by its listed capital-goods peers — but those are different denominators measuring different things, and a P/E of 32.7x on a peer's earnings is not comparable to an EV/EBITDA of 8.5x on Tega's. The comparison is directionally suggestive and it is not a valuation argument on its own.

**The P/B of 3.8x should not be read as a floor, and here the arithmetic is uncomfortable.** The ₹451 book value per share is ₹3,407 Cr of consolidated equity. Sitting inside the same balance sheet is ₹8,425 Cr of goodwill and intangibles — **2.5x the equity**. On the face of those two figures, tangible equity is **negative ₹5,018 Cr, or about −₹664 a share** on 7.56 crore shares. That is not unusual for a buyout-structured consolidation, where the acquiree's assets are revalued up into intangibles and the acquisition debt sits alongside them, and it does not mean the company is insolvent. It does mean the book value provides no asset backing in the ordinary sense, and that an impairment (Section 13, risk 1) would remove the number that the P/B is calculated on rather than merely reduce it.

**One caveat on the equity figure itself.** The ₹3,407 Cr equity and the ₹22,571 Cr post-acquisition balance sheet do not obviously belong to the same date: ₹3,407 Cr is the 31 March 2026 figure carried into Section 1, and a 30 June equity should have absorbed the ₹108.3 Cr quarterly loss. Before the book value is used as a hard input to anything, it needs reconciling against the Q1 filing's own balance sheet. The conclusion above — that goodwill and intangibles exceed equity — survives either basis.

### 11.3 What the valuation implies, in one paragraph

At ₹1,723.50 the market is paying ₹19,397 Cr of enterprise value for a business that, on the most favourable reading available, generates ₹2,050–2,350 Cr of EBITDA. That is 8.3x–9.5x, which is not expensive for a company with a transformational asset and a deleveraging path to 3x. The problem is not the EV multiple; it is that **nothing between that EBITDA line and the EPS line is knowable yet**: ₹467 Cr of annualised interest, ₹294 Cr of annualised depreciation at Q1's rate (both understated, because Q1 held one month of the acquired business), a tax rate, and a non-controlling interest that took 20% of the group loss in Q1. Until Q2 FY27 reports a full quarter, any forward PE on this stock is a guess dressed as a model. That is why this section ends without one.

---

## 12. Recent News & Catalysts

### The calendar that matters

| Date | Event | Where it stands |
|---|---|---|
| 30 Sep 2026 | Panamanian inter-ministerial commission recommends restarting Cobre Panama to President Mulino | Recommendation made; a decision was expected before the end of 2026. Not a restart. |
| 30 Sep 2026 | 52-week high ₹2,198 | Since unwound 21.6% |
| 6 Oct 2026 | NSE/BSE in-principle approval for the preferential issue | Routine; preceded the allotment |
| 15 Oct 2026 | ₹95.40 Cr allotment to AP Jupiter Holdings II at ₹1,994 | Complete; 0.63% of enlarged equity |
| By 14 Nov 2026 | Q2 FY27 results (SEBI 45-day limit for the September quarter) | **Not yet announced.** First quarter with three full months of Molycop |
| Jan 2027 | Chile soft commissioning target | Has slipped on three consecutive calls |
| Mar 2027 | Chile commercial production target, subject to approvals | Same caveat |
| 31 Mar 2027 | First annual impairment test on ₹4,995.7 Cr of goodwill | The first real examination of the purchase-price allocation |
| FY28 | Cobre Panama and Grasberg restart, per current guidance | The guidance that was cut on 13 August assumed FY27 |

### Positive

- **Cobre Panama moved closer to a restart on 30 September 2026.** An inter-ministerial commission recommended a restart to the President, under a framework in which the state would partner with First Quantum and the restart would self-finance the mine's eventual closure. First Quantum said it would engage "constructively and in good faith" on a new legal framework. The mine was producing about 1.5% of world copper before it stopped in 2023 and was once 40% of First Quantum's revenue.
- **The US$120 mn earnout is tied to that same restart.** A restart both adds grinding-media volume and removes a contingent liability that S&P currently counts as adjusted debt — the only single event in the record that improves revenue and leverage at the same time.
- **Net debt fell ₹3,218 Cr in one quarter**, to ₹6,366 Cr, against ₹9,580 Cr at 31 March 2026.
- **Legacy margins expanded**, with consumables excluding grinding media up 320 bps to 24.1% and legacy EBITDA margin at 22.1%.
- **Molycop's June month beat the underwrite**, at 13.2% against the ~12% earned across its own FY26 and against what management had underwritten.
- **Apollo took direct equity at ₹1,994 on 15 October** — the same price as the November 2025 round, in a stock trading 13.6% below it. A related party buying at a 13.6% premium to market is a signal, however small the cheque.

### Neutral

- **Exchange filings in October were capital-action steps, not operating news.** The in-principle approval (6 Oct), the allotment (15 Oct) and a Regulation 169(5) auditor certificate (16 Oct) are the whole of the month's record. There is no disclosure at all between 16 and 23 October.
- **Molycop's FY27 volume guidance was cut to 3% from 7–8%** on 13 August, with the Cobre Panama and Grasberg restart deferred to FY28 — a cut that the 30 September recommendation may be about to reverse.
- **The Chile plant is 50–60% complete on civil work**, with soft commissioning January 2027 and commercial production March 2027, subject to approval, at US$25–30 mn of capital cost.
- **Q2 FY27 is due by 14 November 2026.** It is the first quarter containing three full months of Molycop and therefore the first clean read on group EBITDA, interest cost and whether the first-quarter deleveraging was a refinancing effect or a run-rate.

### Negative

- **Tega McNally's revenue fell 44%** to ₹35.8 Cr and the segment swung to an operating loss, on what management called delayed customer clearances. It is the second consecutive year the equipment growth case has slipped.
- **The stock fell 21.6% from its 30 September high with no company-specific filing to explain it.** Nothing was disclosed between 16 and 23 October. Anyone looking for a filing-shaped explanation for October will not find one.
- **FY26 — the last clean pre-Molycop year — was a margin year**, with operating profit down 32% to ₹233 Cr, OPM down from 21% to 14%, and ROCE down to 8% from 18%.
- **The market-wide backdrop was hostile**: the entire cyclical complex sold off in the month, with Nifty Metal −13.7% and Nifty Capital Goods −11.6%.

---

## 13. Key Risks

**1. Goodwill and intangibles — ₹8,425 Cr, 37% of assets, provisional.** The purchase-price allocation is not final. Ind AS 103 allows up to a year from acquisition to adjust it, and the annual impairment test at 31 March 2027 will be the first real examination of whether ₹4,995.7 Cr of goodwill is supported. If Molycop's FY27 comes in at 3% growth rather than 7–8%, the headroom narrows. An impairment would not affect cash flow or covenants, but it would affect book value, reported EPS, and sentiment — and at 3.8x book, book value is not decorative here.

**2. Leverage, and the specific shape of it.** A 'B−' rating at the JV level is a leveraged-finance credit, not an investment-grade one. S&P's downside case is explicit: leverage above 7x in fiscal 2027 revises the outlook to stable. The mitigants are real — ₹4,800 Cr of cash, US$20–30 mn of annual free operating cash flow expected by S&P, and a financial policy aimed at debt reduction rather than distributions. But the refinancing risk sits at the JV, and Tega does not control the JV outright.

**3. Molycop is a steel-price pass-through business with a lag.** About **80% of Molycop's cost of goods sold is steel bar**, and roughly **85% of its customer contracts are indexed to steel prices with a one-to-two-quarter lag**. That makes percentage margins a poor lens and per-tonne economics the right one — management said as much on the call. It also means a sharp steel move distorts two quarters of reported margin in whichever direction it moves.

**4. Non-controlling interest takes a fifth of Molycop before Tega shareholders see it.** In Q1, ₹22.1 Cr of the ₹108.3 Cr loss was attributed to non-controlling interest — about 20% of Molycop's economics. Apollo's US$270 mn of preferred equity accrues a payment-in-kind dividend that sits ahead of common equity. Consolidated revenue and EBITDA are not the same as what accrues to a Tega shareholder, and the gap is roughly a fifth.

**5. Customer concentration in two metals.** Roughly **75–77% of consumables revenue comes from copper and gold miners**. That is a throughput bet on two commodities — defensible, since grinding media is about 6% of a mine's cash cost and mines do not economise on it, but it does mean Tega's volume is hostage to other companies' decisions to expand, restart or mothball mines. That is precisely the mechanism that moved FY27 guidance from 8% to 3%.

**6. Freight and logistics are a recurring, not a one-off, problem.** Red Sea disruption left roughly ₹50 Cr of finished goods undelivered at the end of FY26, representing about ₹100 Cr of revenue that slid into the next quarter. This is a bespoke, design-led product shipped in containers to mine sites; there is no spot market to redirect.

**7. Promoter holding has fallen 7.37 percentage points over three years, to 67.51%, and there has been no promoter buying.** The dilution came from the November 2025 preferential issue rather than from selling, which is the benign version. But the direction is one way, and the October allotment to Apollo was to a non-promoter at the same ₹1,994 price.

**8. The 44% collapse in equipment revenue may not be purely timing.** Management called it delayed customer clearances. Two consecutive years of slipped equipment growth is a pattern worth naming, even if the explanation is legitimate.

---

## 14. Screener.in Pros and Cons

**Pros (as published):**
- Company is expected to give good quarter.

**Cons (as published):**
- Company has low interest coverage ratio.
- Company has a low return on equity of 11.1% over last 3 years.
- Earnings include an other income of Rs.89.1 Cr.
- Dividend payout has been low at 8.02% of profits over last 3 years.
- Promoter holding has decreased over last 3 years: -7.37%.

**What the machine is right about, and where the list is thin.**

The **other-income con is the single most important line on the list and it is arithmetically brutal**: ₹89.1 Cr of other income against ₹41 Cr of TTM profit before tax means that **without other income the trailing twelve months would have been a pre-tax loss of about ₹48 Cr**. Strip the treasury and forex income out and this company has not earned anything at the operating line in five quarters. No other line in the published pros and cons matters as much as this one.

The **interest-coverage con is correct on the TTM column** — operating profit ₹231 Cr against interest ₹133 Cr is 1.7x, and that is the arithmetic Screener is doing. It is also the least favourable way to compute it, because the TTM column holds one month of Molycop debt against twelve months of legacy operations. On Q1's own figures, segment result of ₹246.5 Cr against ₹116.7 Cr of quarterly finance cost is 2.1x. Both numbers say the same thing: coverage is thin, and the interest line is now the largest single call on the P&L after cost of goods.

The **ROE con (11.1% over three years)** is a fair reading of a business that earned 18–21% on capital in FY23–FY25 and 8% in FY26. The **promoter con (−7.37%)** is factually right and the mechanism is dilution rather than sale, which Section 6 explains. The **dividend con** is right and irrelevant: at a 0.12% yield, the payout ratio is not part of the equity case, and with ₹467 Cr of annualised interest and a 3x leverage target, a low payout is the correct policy.

**The pros list is the failure mode of the list, not a finding.** A single entry — "company is expected to give good quarter" — is a forward consensus flag, not a statement about the business, and it is the kind of line that appears for a company with no trailing earnings to score. There is no debt pro (Tega no longer qualifies), no growth pro (profit fell 28% in FY26), and no balance-sheet pro. **A one-line pros list against a five-line cons list is itself a signal**: the screen's arithmetic cannot find much to like in a company whose earnings are negative, whose returns have halved, and whose equity was diluted three times in three years. The article's own view (Section 17) is not as negative as that, and the difference is the run-rate arithmetic in Section 4, which the screen cannot see.

---

## 15. Bull vs Bear

### 15.1 Bull case

- **The leverage problem is already smaller than the headline.** Net debt fell ₹3,218 Cr in a single quarter to ₹6,366 Cr, which against ₹2,050–2,350 Cr of run-rate EBITDA is **2.7x–3.1x — at the 3x target management set for three to four years out.** The market is pricing a leveraged acquisition; the first quarter's arithmetic says the leverage is already close to policy.
- **EV/EBITDA of 8.3x–9.5x on run-rate is not an expensive price** for a business that has just become the world's largest forged grinding-media producer, against a 32.7x median P/E for listed capital-goods peers (Section 17).
- **Molycop beat its own underwrite in the first month.** ₹171.1 Cr of operating result on ₹1,291.6 Cr of revenue is a 13.2% margin, against the ~12% Molycop earned across its whole FY26 and marginally ahead of what management underwrote at the deal.
- **The legacy business is not the problem it was in FY26.** Consumables excluding grinding media grew revenue 36% and expanded margin 320 bps to 24.1%; legacy EBITDA margin reached 22.1% against 19.1%. The FY26 margin collapse (Section 3.1) is being reversed at the segment level.
- **The demand driver is a physical constraint, not a fashion.** Declining ore grades require more milling per tonne of metal, grinding media is about 6% of a mine's cash cost, and 85% of contracts are steel-indexed so revenue holds while input costs pass through with a lag.
- **Cobre Panama is a live option that costs nothing to hold,** and the US$120 mn earnout means a restart improves revenue and adjusted leverage at once.
- **Cash conversion is genuinely good.** ₹350 Cr of operating cash against ₹143 Cr of FY26 net profit, and four good conversion years out of five. The legacy business earns its reported profit in cash.

### 15.2 Bear case

- **FY26 broke before the deal did.** Operating profit fell 32% to ₹233 Cr, OPM from 21% to 14%, ROCE from 18% to 8% — on a 3% increase in sales. The acquisition was bolted onto a business whose returns had already halved, and the bull case has to explain FY26 rather than skip to the run-rate.
- **Nothing between EBITDA and EPS is knowable.** ₹467 Cr of annualised interest, ₹294 Cr of annualised depreciation at Q1's rate, a tax rate, and a non-controlling interest that took 20% of the group loss. Section 11 cannot compute a forward PE and does not pretend to; anyone who quotes one is guessing.
- **The earnings quality is thin even before Molycop.** ₹89.1 Cr of other income against ₹41 Cr of TTM pre-tax profit means the trailing year without other income is a ₹48 Cr pre-tax loss. Screener's con is correct and it is the most important line in Section 14.
- **37% of the balance sheet is provisional goodwill and intangibles,** and the first impairment test is 31 March 2027. At 2.5x equity, the ₹451 book value per share is not asset backing, and P/B of 3.8x is a multiple on an intangible claim.
- **S&P's own number is 7x–7.5x, not 2.7x–3.1x,** and the gap is not a misunderstanding — it includes the US$270 mn of preferred, the US$120 mn earnout and US$50 mn of other adjustments. The company's ratio excludes all three. Both are defensible; only one is a rating agency's.
- **The FY26 cash flow was partly a payables release.** 62 extra days of supplier credit produced most of the 59-day improvement in the cash conversion cycle. That is a one-time source, and it reverses if suppliers tighten.
- **The guidance was cut once already, and the equipment business has now disappointed twice.** A management that cuts volume guidance by more than half and misses a commissioning date three times has not earned the benefit of the doubt on FY28 restart timing.
- **The chart is broken.** Price is below all fifteen moving averages, the checklist scores 8/25, and there is no base. A good business and a bad chart can coexist, and Section 9 says this one currently does.

### 15.3 What changes the story from here

This is a company whose earnings will look materially different in two quarters than they do today, in either direction. Four observable things decide which.

**Molycop's volume guidance was cut, and then the reason for the cut moved.** On the 13 August call, management **cut Molycop's FY27 growth guidance to 3% from an informal 7–8%**. The reason given was specific: the guidance had assumed the Cobre Panama and Grasberg mines would restart in FY27, adding a step-change in grinding-media volume, and "based on current market indicators, this restart has been deferred to FY28."

That is the correct thing to hold in mind when reading any older note on this stock. But the position moved again seven weeks later, and the earlier framing is now out of date. On **30 September 2026**, a Panamanian inter-ministerial commission **recommended to President José Raúl Mulino that Cobre Panama be restarted**, under a framework in which the state would partner with First Quantum and the restart would self-finance the mine's eventual closure. First Quantum said it would engage "constructively and in good faith" on a new legal framework. First Quantum had already resumed processing stockpiled ore in July 2026 under government authorisation — that is not new extraction, and the mine remains closed to mining. **A decision was expected before the end of 2026.**

The investment significance is twofold. Cobre Panama was producing about 1.5% of world copper before it stopped in 2023 and was once 40% of First Quantum's revenue; its grinding-media consumption is a direct volume input to Molycop. And the **US$120 mn earnout is specifically tied to the Cobre Panama and Grasberg restarts** — so a restart both adds revenue and removes a contingent liability that S&P currently counts as debt.

None of this is in the numbers. It is a live option, not a forecast, and it should be weighted as one.

**Cross-selling has not started, and management has said so.** Both the CEO and the CFO were explicit that revenue synergies are a **Q3–Q4 FY27 event**, not a Q1–Q2 one, and asked for "a couple of quarters of patience." The targeted figure is approximately **US$20 mn of synergies over two to two and a half years** — procurement, SG&A, operating efficiency.

US$20 mn against US$2 bn of revenue is about 1%. It is real but it is not the reason to own this. The reason to own it is the volume and pricing power of a combined platform selling two complementary consumables into the same mill — and that shows up in the order book and in per-tonne economics, not in a synergy line.

**The Chile plant is the nearest hard catalyst.** The Chile facility — aimed at the South American copper base where Tega currently relies on "alternate plants" — was **50–60% complete on civil work** at the time of the call, with soft commissioning targeted for January 2027 and commercial production for March 2027, subject to regulatory approval. Management flagged that bookings may slip into the following year if approvals lag. Capital cost is around US$25–30 mn. This has been the one date that slipped across three consecutive calls, so treat the March 2027 target as a target.

**Q2 FY27 results, due by 14 November 2026.** The 45-day limit for the quarter ended 30 September 2026 is 14 November 2026. This is the first quarter containing **three full months of Molycop** and therefore the first clean read on group EBITDA, interest cost, and whether the ₹3,218 Cr of first-quarter deleveraging was a one-off refinancing effect or a run-rate. Everything in this article that is currently arithmetic becomes evidence, or does not, on that date.

---

## 16. 25-Point Swing Trading Checklist Assessment

Assessed against the 23 October 2026 close of ₹1,723.50, using the indicator panel in Section 9 and the delivery data in Section 9.4.

| # | Checklist item | Evidence | Verdict |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Price position | 21.6% below the ₹2,198 high — inside the 25% band, barely | Pass |
| 2 | Trend | Lower highs at ₹2,198 → ₹2,167 → ₹1,923; no higher lows since 30 September | Fail |
| 3 | Volume characteristics | Volume expanded 2.4x over the 200-day average on the rally, then faded to 1.07x on the decline — expansion was in the wrong direction | Caution |
| 4 | Clean price action | A +9.6% session on 21 September, a −7.8% session on 8 October, a −21.6% three-week drawdown, ATR 5.4% | Fail |
| 5 | EMA alignment | EMA20 ₹1,896.7 > EMA10 ₹1,861.0 > EMA50 ₹1,844.9 > EMA200 ₹1,760.0 — mis-stacked, and price below all four | Fail |
| 6 | Chart pattern and base | No base; a failed breakout above ₹2,167 and a blow-off high at ₹2,198 | Fail |
| 7 | Base quality | Nothing is consolidating — the stock is still in price discovery to the downside | Fail |
| 8 | ADR | ADR 4.67%, ATR ₹92.75 (5.4%) — ample range for a swing, wide enough to demand smaller size | Pass |
| 9 | Primary uptrend | Nifty 50 is 9.8% below its January 2026 level; smallcaps −11.0% in a month; price below its own 200-DMA | Fail |
| 10 | Follow one model | A breakout model has nothing to break; a pullback model needs a confirmed higher low that does not yet exist | Caution |
| 11 | Sector strength | Nifty Capital Goods −11.6% and Nifty Metal −13.7% over the month — the sector is the source of the weakness | Fail |
| 12 | Tailwind | Record gold and copper prices, declining ore grades requiring more milling, Cobre Panama restart recommended on 30 September | Pass |
| 13 | IPO consideration | Listed in 2021; five years of price history, not a post-IPO base | Pass |
| 14 | Price action strength | +10.8% over three months against −9.8% for Capital Goods, but −17.1% over the month against −11.6% | Caution |
| 15 | Sector and government boost | No Indian policy catalyst; the drivers are Panamanian and Indonesian mining approvals and global copper prices | Caution |
| 16 | Fundamental quality | Transformational asset and 22% legacy margins, but ROCE down to 8.14%, ₹6,366 Cr net debt and a reported quarterly loss | Caution |
| 17 | Quarterly earnings growth | Revenue +384% but EPS −₹11.47 against +₹5.31; profit growth is negative | Fail |
| 18 | Delivery percentage | 40.99% against its own ten-session average of 41.37% (delta −0.38 pp) on 1.07x volume — flat, no accumulation signal | Caution |
| 19 | News and institutional activity | Molycop closed, ₹1,714 Cr raised in November 2025, Apollo taking direct equity in October; FII 2.86% (from 1.87% a year ago), DII 17.15% | Pass |
| 20 | Risk management | Entry, stop and targets are defined in Section 17; the stop is 3.7% below the current price and 4.3% below the 200-day SMA — tight for a 5.4% ATR, so size is the variable | Pass |
| 21 | Market environment | Smallcaps −11.0% and midcaps −10.2% in a month; the market is not supportive of high-beta longs | Fail |
| 22 | Liquidity | ₹44.6 Cr traded on 23 October; 50-day average volume 5.44 lakh shares (₹94 Cr a day) | Pass |
| 23 | Relative strength | Beats the index by 18 pp over three months, trails it by 6 pp over one month | Caution |
| 24 | Breakout confirmation | None. Price broke *down* through every short and medium average | Fail |
| 25 | Trading psychology | The temptation is to average into a name that has fallen 21.6% on a story you like. That is the FOMO trade in reverse | Pass |

**Score: 8 / 25 — Weak. Pass for a swing entry.**

| Score range | Meaning |
|---|---|
| 22–25 | Strong — consider entry |
| 17–21 | Moderate — needs a catalyst |
| **Below 17** | **Weak — pass** |

Eight passes is a low score, and it is the right one. Note what is *not* failing: liquidity, tailwind, institutional participation, price position, and the discipline of waiting. What is failing is the entire trend, base, and momentum structure. A stock can be a good business and a bad chart at the same time, and this one currently is.

---

## 17. Final Verdict

**Verdict: CAUTION.** Do not chase, and do not bottom-fish before the 200-day band is reclaimed.

The business case improved materially in 2026 and the arithmetic is better than the headline loss suggests: revenue has quintupled, legacy margins are expanding, net debt fell ₹3,218 Cr in a single quarter to 2.7x–3.1x of run-rate EBITDA on my arithmetic, and at ₹19,397 Cr of enterprise value the stock trades at 8.3x–9.5x run-rate EBITDA against a 32.7x median P/E for its listed capital-goods peers. None of that is reflected in the reported EPS, because ₹117 Cr of quarterly interest and ₹74 Cr of quarterly depreciation get there first.

But the equity story and the chart are on different timelines. The chart says the September re-rating has unwound and the stock is testing its 200-day average from above-turned-below. The story says Q2 FY27 — three full months of Molycop, due by 14 November — is the first quarter where the numbers can confirm or refute the thesis. Buying before that print is a bet on a binary, and the checklist scores 8/25 for exactly that reason.

**Levels, as of 23 October 2026 close (₹1,723.50):**

- **Immediate support: ₹1,678** — the 23 October intraday low, within ₹17 of Classic S1 at ₹1,694.9. A close below this opens ₹1,630 (the 16 September swing low), and below that the 52-week low of ₹1,473 sits 14.5% below the current price.
- **Immediate resistance: ₹1,760–1,762** — the 200-day EMA, where the 200-day SMA at ₹1,734.6 and the Hull MA at ₹1,737.3 also sit. This is the band that decides whether October was a pullback or a trend change.
- **Above that: ₹1,790–1,866** — the supply shelf formed by the 21–22 October closes (₹1,792, ₹1,770) and the 13 October low of ₹1,866.
- **The re-rating level: ₹1,994** — the price at which both the November 2025 and October 2026 preferential issues were struck. Reclaiming it would put the stock back above the cost basis of the equity that funded the deal.
- **Stop discipline:** anyone holding should be out below ₹1,660, which is under the 23 October low. That stop is 3.7% below the current price and 4.3% below the 200-day SMA — still tight against an ATR of ₹92.75 (5.4%), which argues for smaller position size rather than a wider stop.

**What would change the verdict to favourable, in order of importance:**

1. **Q2 FY27 group EBITDA at or above ₹550 Cr with net debt below ₹6,000 Cr** — proves June was a run-rate, not a quarter-end effect.
2. **A close above ₹1,762 on volume at 1.5x the ten-session average** — reclaims the 200-day band with participation rather than on a bounce.
3. **A formal Cobre Panama restart decision** — the single largest swing factor, worth both revenue and the removal of the US$120 mn earnout from adjusted debt.
4. **Chile commissioning on the January/March 2027 schedule** — removes the one date that has slipped three times.

**What would confirm the caution was right:** a close below ₹1,678 followed by failure to reclaim it within two weeks, or Q2 group EBITDA materially below ₹450 Cr, which would put leverage on the wrong side of the deleveraging path S&P's positive outlook depends on.

---

## 18. Exchange Filings & Material Announcements

The exchange record for the last 180 days holds **15 filings** that the screening tooling classifies as price-moving by category, against **496** in the company's full history; a further **43 routine items** (depository certificates, trading-window closures, AGM and voting paperwork, analyst-meet notices) are suppressed by default. The six that carry information are below, with a verdict rather than a summary.

**Molycop closing press release (1 June 2026) — material, and the single most important document in this set.** It confirms completion, the ~US$1.5 bn enterprise value, Tega as controlling shareholder with Apollo holding a significant minority equity interest, 13 manufacturing facilities and 3 active joint ventures being added, a combined 26 sites, and — critically — a stated priority of "operational and business integration" over the first eight quarters. The press release does not disclose the purchase consideration, the funding structure, or the leverage. Those came from the results filing and from S&P, not from the company's own announcement. That is worth noting: the announcement a retail reader is most likely to see carried none of the numbers that determine the equity outcome.

**Q1 FY27 results (13 August 2026) — material, and the substance.** Unmodified limited review by Walker Chandiok & Co LLP, revenue ₹1,723.4 Cr, loss attributable to owners ₹86.2 Cr, EPS −₹11.47, and the provisional purchase-price allocation in Note 5. Also disclosed: the one-time ₹191.0 Cr, the ₹4,190.7 Cr purchase consideration, and the ₹4,995.7 Cr goodwill. This is the only filing that contains the numbers this article is built on.

**Preferential allotment to AP Jupiter Holdings II, Ltd. (15 October 2026) — material capital action, and the most informative document of the last month.** 4,78,435 equity shares issued at **₹1,994 a share** — including a premium of ₹1,984 — for ₹95.40 Cr, taking paid-up capital from 7,51,27,698 to 7,56,06,133 shares. AP Jupiter Holdings II is an Apollo entity and a non-promoter; it now holds 0.63%. The size is trivial. The signals are not: **the transaction price is identical to the November 2025 preferential issue**, and it puts Apollo's consortium partner directly on Tega's register rather than only inside the JV. The stock is now ₹1,723.50, **13.6% below the price at which both of those rounds were struck.**

**NSE/BSE in-principle approval (6 October 2026) — routine, procedural.** The exchanges' in-principle approval for the preferential issue, the step that had to precede the 15 October allotment. It is not a separate event, and reading it as one would double-count the capital action.

**Statutory auditor certificate under Regulation 169(5) of the SEBI ICDR Regulations (16 October 2026) — a non-event.** This is a post-allotment compliance certificate relating to the preferential issue, filed under a category the exchange classifies as "material: leadership." It carries no information about the business.

**Dividend payment date (1 September 2026) — routine.** The dividend itself was declared earlier in the year; this filing only fixes the pay date. At a 0.12% yield, the dividend is not part of the equity case. (The 2.15 MB file size for a one-page pay-date notice is itself a small reminder to read the document and not the metadata.)

**What the six collectively imply:** the capital action is complete, the governance steps are clean, and the accounts carry an unmodified review. Nothing in the filing record explains the 21.6% decline since 30 September — there is no disclosure at all between 16 and 23 October, and the October filings are capital-action steps rather than operating news. **Anyone looking for a filing-shaped explanation for October will not find one**, which is itself informative: what moved was the stock, not the company.

The primary documents behind the section above, as filed with NSE:

- [Completion of the Molycop acquisition, press release](https://nsearchives.nseindia.com/corporate/TEGA_01062026225456_Press_Release_Closing_sd.pdf) — 1 June 2026
- [Unaudited consolidated results for the quarter ended 30 June 2026, with limited review report](https://nsearchives.nseindia.com/corporate/TEGA_13082026143805_Intimation_Outcome_BM_sd.pdf) — 13 August 2026
- [Allotment of 4,78,435 equity shares at ₹1,994 to AP Jupiter Holdings II, Ltd.](https://nsearchives.nseindia.com/corporate/TEGA_15102026105407_Initmation_for_allotment_shares_sd.pdf) — 15 October 2026
- [In-principle approval from NSE and BSE for the preferential issue](https://nsearchives.nseindia.com/corporate/TEGA_06102026191055_Intimation_Of_In_principle_approval_sd.pdf) — 6 October 2026
- [Certificate of statutory auditor under Regulation 169(5), SEBI ICDR Regulations](https://nsearchives.nseindia.com/corporate/TEGA_16102026180802_Intimation_of_Stat_Auditor_Cert_sd.pdf) — 16 October 2026
- [Intimation of date of payment of dividend](https://nsearchives.nseindia.com/corporate/TEGA_01092026152438_Intimation_of_Payment_of_Dividend_sd.pdf) — 1 September 2026

---

## 19. Disclaimer & Sources

**Disclaimer.** This is educational research, not investment advice. It is written by an AI model from public sources and published under the byline Pulkit Goel; it is not a substitute for advice from a SEBI-registered investment adviser. The author holds no position in Tega Industries. Prices, ratios and filed figures are as of the dates stated and change daily. Three judgements in this note are opinion rather than arithmetic — that Q2 FY27 is the resolving event, that FY26's margin decline is a bigger problem for the bull case than the market currently treats it, and that the 8.3x–9.5x run-rate EBITDA multiple is cheap for the asset — and the article says which evidence would overturn each.

**Data notes and disclosures**

- **Price, volume and delivery** are from NSE bhavcopy for the ten sessions ended 23 October 2026 and from the daily price series; the last close ₹1,723.50 matches the exchange and the index-level report.
- **Delivery percentages** are read from the bhavcopy's `DELIV_PER` column and compared against the stock's own ten-session average, not an absolute threshold. A 41% delivery rate is unremarkable for this stock; the 21 October print of 56.78% is the outlier.
- **Technicals** are TradingView's NSE technical panel at close on 23 October 2026, cross-checked against indicators computed independently from the daily series. They agree on RSI (37.2), EMA20 (₹1,896) and SMA200 (₹1,735 vs ₹1,734.6).
- **Screener.in**, consolidated view, fetched 25 October 2026: annual P&L and ratios FY15–FY26, balance sheet FY15–FY26, cash-flow statement FY17–FY26, shareholding Mar 2022–Sep 2026, and the published pros and cons. Sections 3.1, 3.4, 4, 5, 6 and 14 are built on this data set.
- **Screener's annual columns are March year-ends**, and every table in this note labels them as such. The TTM column is the twelve months to June 2026 and is a blend of twelve months of legacy operations with one month of Molycop; it is not annualised anywhere.
- **The TTM net profit and TTM EPS in Section 3.1 do not reconcile** — −₹1 Cr against ₹0.64 — and the EPS line is not used in this note. The −₹1 Cr ties to "profit for the period" before the ₹22.1 Cr attributed to non-controlling interest. The filing's own attributable figure, −₹86.2 Cr for Q1 FY27, is what the analysis uses.
- **The ₹3,407 Cr equity in Section 1 is the 31 March 2026 figure** and should be reconciled against the 30 June 2026 balance sheet (total ₹22,571 Cr) before being used as a hard input. Section 11.2 flags this and states which conclusions survive either basis.
- **The Q1 FY27 investor presentation PDF** was not used: the NSE archive URL for the 13 August deck (TEGA_13082026150017) returns a 404 at the time of writing. Segment detail, guidance and the deleveraging figures therefore come from the results filing itself and from the earnings-call transcript, both of which are primary.
- **Management-sourced figures** — Molycop's FY26 revenue of US$1,539 mn and ~12% EBITDA margin, the 3% FY27 guidance, the US$20 mn synergy target, total group debt of ~₹11,200 Cr including ₹2,600 Cr of redeemable preference shares, and net debt of ₹6,366 Cr at 30 June 2026 — are from the 13 August 2026 earnings call. They are management representations, not audited figures, and are labelled as such throughout.
- **The 2.7x–3.1x net debt/EBITDA calculation and the ₹2,050–2,350 Cr run-rate EBITDA range are mine**, derived from disclosed segment results, and are marked as arithmetic rather than guidance. The ₹4,800 Cr implied cash balance is likewise arithmetic (disclosed total debt less disclosed net debt), not a separately disclosed figure. The implied P/E table in Section 11.1 and the tangible-equity figure in Section 11.2 are divisions of disclosed numbers, not forecasts.
- **No forward EPS estimate, bulk/block deal record or Molycop order-book figure exists in the data behind this note.** Sections 11, 10 and 7 respectively say so rather than filling the gap, and no estimate is substituted for any of the three.
- **Not obtained:** the final purchase-price allocation (provisional under Ind AS 103 for up to one year), a covenant schedule for the parent-level ₹1,500 Cr facility, Molycop's standalone FY26 accounts, and any trade-tape detail that would distinguish the 21 October delivery print between a seller and a buyer. Where those are missing, the article says so rather than filling the gap.

*This analysis is for educational and research purposes only. It does not constitute investment advice. Please consult a SEBI-registered investment advisor before making investment decisions.*